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he world’s oil market has been rallying since 2004 and prices have risen six-fold 
over the last seven years. The Brent Spot Price, the main European benchmark 
price for crude oil set in London, jumped from a low of around US$19 in 
November 2001 to a record high of over US$140 as of July 2008. Is the massive 
increase in price justified by fundamentals or is the oil boom the result of a speculative 
frenzy in commodities driven by bear markets in bonds and stocks? 
The question is indeed a tricky one. Last time real oil prices were so high was in the 
1970s due to disruption in production and shipment following the OPEC oil embargo 
and, later, the Iranian revolution. This time is different: supply-driven shock is not the 
culprit. In the 2000s, global demand has been rising rapidly thanks to developing 
countries’ fast economic growth, while output has failed to keep pace. Though spare 
capacity has decreased, there are no signs of an oil shortage, as some have suggested. 
Different factors account for the hike in prices: let us analyse them in order. 
First, demand growth has been significant in non-OECD countries, especially the 
Middle East and Asia. China, with its energy-intensive development, accounts for 
almost 9% of global oil consumption and 50% of consumption growth in 2007. 
Moreover, subsidised prices in developing countries have not allowed pass-through 
from import to retail prices, preventing high prices from being reflected in reduced 
consumption. However, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, India and Indonesia have all recently 
cut their fuel subsidies as the cost of maintaining them rose in line with the soaring price 
of oil. This move is likely to promote energy efficiency, conservation and investment in 
alternative sources of energy.    
Second, production has stalled because of a lack of investment, geopolitical uncertainty, 
burgeoning extraction costs, re-nationalisation of the oil industry and dwindling wells in 
the North Sea, Russia and North America. Saudi Arabia – the so-called ‘swing 
producer’ for its ability to boost or curtail supply according to global needs, has failed to 
considerably increase its output amid concerns for delayed production at Khursaniyah’s 
oil field (expected to be one of Saudi Arabia’s major oil and gas plants). In light of the 
reduction of OPEC’s spare capacity to below 2.0m barrels per day (bbl/d) from 2.5-
3.0m bbl/d in the past, markets are jittery and price volatility has thereby increased (see 
Figure 1). Furthermore, terrorist acts and low-intensity conflicts in the Niger Delta 
restricted production of the world’s fourth exporter of crude oil to 1.5m bbl/d from 
almost 2.6m bbl/d in 2005.  
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Figure 1. World’s Oil Balance and Real Crude Oil Price Change. 
Annual Frequency 1980-2008. 
-1,800
-1,300
-800
-300
200
700
1,200
1,700
1980
1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
-150%
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
World´s Oil Balance
(Production-Consumption,
'000 of barrels)
Real Price Change YOY %
 
Source: IEA; EAI; US Dept. of Labor. 
Uncertainty is a third factor affecting the oil market in a variety of ways. The lack of 
reliable data on current production, consumption, proven reserves and global stockpiles 
has been a permanent feature of the oil market. Furthermore, beyond present figures, 
projections on future consumption are hard to make because of the difficulties in 
accounting for vastly diverse factors such as technological progress, climate change and 
international developments. With the entry of financial actors into commodity markets, 
contradictory statistics exaggerate the scope for speculation and rapidly changing 
expectations.   
This last element is the fourth component of the equation. In spite of the uncertainty 
surrounding the issue, the belief that we now live in a world where cheap oil is a distant 
memory is all but confirmed. Expectations of an ever-rising price of oil are thus feeding 
into speculation. Only a few commentators mention the fact that the same scenario 
materialised in the 1970s, when it was taken for granted that oil production was 
reaching a peak. This is not to say that an ‘oil counter-shock’, similar to the one we 
witnessed in the 1980s, is on its way. But as the price of oil approaches US$200, it will 
trigger a market response that will boost production and reduce consumption; thereby 
bringing oil prices back to a level reflecting fundamentals (a range of US$100-120 
might be realistic). 
This leads us to another factor affecting the recent surge in oil prices: financial 
considerations. The depreciation of the dollar has had an impact on oil prices: as the 
dollar slides against other currencies, oil producers must raise their prices because 
inputs coming from other currency areas have become more expensive. As illustrated by 
Figure 2, the correlation is not linear and the recent spike in oil prices does not seem to 
be linked to dollar depreciation.  
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Figure 2. Dollar Effective Exchange Rate and Real Crude Oil Prices. 
Monthly Frequency 1980-2008. 
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Source: Bank for International Settlement (BIS) and Energy Information Agency, US Department of 
Energy (EAI – DOE.)  
Although speculation in commodities has certainly played a role in accelerating the 
sudden surge in oil prices, the evidence is mixed. If speculation were the root cause of 
the phenomenon, you would expect commercial stockpiles to increase so that a profit 
could be made by selling crude oil in the future. Yet Figure 3 (see below) suggests 
otherwise: US oil inventories are normal or below the historical average. Some claim 
that hoarding is not showing in the statistics because producers are just not pumping 
enough oil, expecting prices to remain high or increase in the foreseeable future.  
As long as it is unclear how oil futures impact spot prices, the contradictory evidence 
has split public opinion between two camps: those who argue that speculators are to 
blame and those who consider that prices correctly signal economic fundamentals. 
Clearly, politicians have sided with the former category, as finding scapegoats is a 
convenient strategy when public resentment turns up the heat on elected officials. Both 
sides of the debate can boast eminent intellectuals among their ranks, however.  
Moreover, as regulatory frameworks across continents have diverged because of distinct 
environmental concerns and sensibilities, the world oil market has fragmented. This 
means that once crude oil is refined into gasoline of different qualities, it cannot be 
exchanged freely to adjust for surprises in demand and supply. In times of distress, this 
phenomenon can have a direct impact on global oil prices.  
To conclude, the sheer complexity of the oil market does not vouchsafe a simple 
explanation for the surge in oil prices. In the long-term, reduced spare capacity, 
increased demand and burgeoning extraction costs suggest that oil prices are bound to 
remain both high and volatile. In the short-term, however, it is a combination of 
speculation, changing expectations and general uncertainty that has led to the surge in 
oil prices.  
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Figure 3. US Oil Commercial Stocks and Real Oil Price. 
Monthly Frequency 1980-2008. 
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Source: EAI. 